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BEYOND THE TIDE: 
BEGINNING ADMIRALTY WITH THE STEAMBOAT MAGNOLIA 
JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN* 
INTRODUCTION 
Admiralty is potentially one of the richest subjects in the law school 
curriculum.  This claim may be received skeptically by those who have neither 
taught nor taken the course.  Yet my experience as a student in, and teacher of, 
the course confirms my belief that Admiralty holds that promise, especially if 
it is presented not simply as a vehicle to train the relatively few who hope to 
become maritime lawyers, but as an opportunity for students with different 
aspirations to explore some of the most interesting issues in law.  As a 
crosscutting course, Admiralty offers a chance to integrate materials and 
concepts from other classes, including civil procedure, torts, contracts, 
property, constitutional law, choice of law, and federal courts.  It offers a 
comparative lens through which to view rules and principles in land law and 
accordingly achieve a better understanding of doctrine explored in earlier 
courses.  And it provides a venue to consider, in an admiralty context, some of 
the most interesting questions that arise across the curriculum.1 
I first reached this surprising conclusion regarding the reach and richness 
of the subject when I took Admiralty in law school from Professor Donald T. 
Trautman.  He was not an admiralty specialist, but was a leading scholar of 
conflicts of law with a strong interest in federal common law.  He taught 
Admiralty in the manner here recommended, a statement which inverts cause 
and effect since his presentation influenced the way I later taught the course, 
first as an adjunct professor for four years at Washington University School of 
Law beginning in 1990 while practicing admiralty law, and later at Saint Louis 
University School of Law when I joined this faculty.  The merit of that vision 
was confirmed each time I taught the subject. 
 
* Vincent C. Immel Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law.  Thanks to Colin 
Luoma for exemplary research assistance.  I alone am responsible for the views and shortcomings 
of this essay. 
 1. See Joel K. Goldstein, Reconceptualizing Admiralty: A Pedagogical Approach, 29 J. 
MAR. L. & COM. 625, 631–35 (1998). 
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The Steamboat Magnolia2 was the first case I studied in Professor 
Trautman’s admiralty class and the first case I have always covered whenever I 
have taught Admiralty.  Until the most recent edition,3 Jo Desha Lucas’ 
admiralty casebook always included a gently edited version,4 and it was there I 
first encountered the case, as a student and then as a teacher.  To my 
disappointment, the casebook I co-authored does not include the case, 
reflecting a choice of some of my eminent co-authors.5  They presented instead 
The Genesee Chief,6 a practice that some other leading casebooks also follow.7  
The Genesee Chief, also a rich case, preceded The Steamboat Magnolia, which 
relied on Chief Justice Taney’s majority opinion.8  But The Steamboat 
Magnolia includes two lengthy and impassioned dissents and, in my view, for 
the reasons stated below is a better teaching tool.  Accordingly, I supplement 
the materials our fine book contains by providing the students with a copy of it. 
The Steamboat Magnolia furnishes a wonderful springboard for teaching 
Admiralty as an integrative/crosscutting/comparative/great issues course.  It is 
an uncommonly rich case to teach and one which demonstrates some of the 
fascination in the study of admiralty law, and of law generally.  And if my 
robust claims for Admiralty are counterintuitive, it may seem even more 
improbable that a case with the apparently mundane subject of The Steamboat 
Magnolia could deliver so much. 
On its face, The Steamboat Magnolia seems to raise the most narrow and 
prosaic of topics, whether admiralty jurisdiction can extend to waters beyond 
 
 2. Jackson v. The Steamboat Magnolia (The Steamboat Magnolia), 61 U.S. (20 How.) 296 
(1857). 
 3. See JO DESHA LUCAS, ADMIRALTY 18–19 (Univ. Casebook Ser., 5th ed. 2003). 
 4. See, e.g., JO DESHA LUCAS, ADMIRALTY 5–30 (Univ. Casebook Ser., 1969); JO DESHA 
LUCAS, ADMIRALTY 5–30 (Univ. Casebook Ser., 2d ed. 1978); JO DESHA LUCAS, ADMIRALTY 5–
30 (Univ. Casebook Ser., 3d ed. 1987); JO DESHA LUCAS, ADMIRALTY 4–29 (Univ. Casebook 
Ser., 4th ed. 1996). 
 5. See ROBERT M. JARVIS, DAVID J. BEDERMAN, JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN & STEVEN R. 
SWANSON, ADMIRALTY (2004). 
 6. The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh (The Genesee Chief), 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 
(1851); ROBERT M. JARVIS, DAVID J. BEDERMAN, JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN & STEVEN R. SWANSON, 
ADMIRALTY 48–53 (2004). 
 7. See, e.g., NICHOLAS J. HEALY, DAVID J. SHARPE & DAVID B. SHARPE, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON ADMIRALTY 14–16, 20–24 (Am. Casebook Ser., 4th ed. 2006) (including a brief 
excerpt from Justice Daniel’s dissent as well as The Genesee Chief and other cases); DAVID W. 
ROBERTSON, STEVEN F. FRIEDELL & MICHAEL F. STURLEY, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 
IN THE UNITED STATES 11–15 (2d ed. 2001) (using The Genesee Chief).  But see 2 ROBERT 
FORCE, A.N. YIANNOPOULOS & MARTIN DAVIES, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 3–13 (2008) 
(including The Steamboat Magnolia); FRANK L. MARAIST, THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR. & 
CATHERINE M. MARAIST, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MARITIME LAW (2d ed. 2009) (including 
neither case). 
 8. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 296, 299 (1857) (citing The Genesee Chief, 
53 U.S. (12 How.) at 444). 
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the ebb and flow of the tide and within the boundaries of a county.  So framed, 
it is hard to imagine a topic which seems more of a snore.  In reality, the case 
was a battleground for some of the political and jurisprudential ideas that were 
hotly contested in court in the late 1850s and ultimately resolved on the 
battlefields a few years later.  And it raises a host of questions of much more 
general interest which mirror some central debates regarding law which 
command continuing interest.  What are the appropriate spheres of state and 
national control?  Of judicial and legislative regulation?  Should the 
Constitution be interpreted in accordance with the apparent intent of its framers 
or to accommodate changing conditions?  What are the advantages and 
disadvantages of bright line rules and balancing tests?  How does social change 
influence law?  How does legal doctrine serve political ends? 
I.  THE CASE AND ITS CONTEXT 
The case arose from a collision on the Alabama River between the 
Steamboat Magnolia and the Steamboat Wetumpka roughly 200 miles above 
tidewater.9  The Wetumpka was navigating up-bound on that river between 
New Orleans and Montgomery, Alabama; the Magnolia was descending 
between Montgomery and Mobile, Alabama.10  The owners of the Wetumpka 
filed a libel against the Magnolia in the United States District Court of the 
Middle District of Alabama alleging that it had tortuously collided with, and 
sunk, their vessel.11  The claimants to the Magnolia moved to dismiss the case 
for want of subject matter jurisdiction and the district court granted their 
motion.12  Although the reasons for the decision were not stated, presumably it 
rested upon the arguments presented to the court, namely that the collision 
occurred within the body of the county and above tidewater.13  The owners of 
the Wetumpka appealed.14 
On the surface, it would be hard to imagine a more bromidic set of issues 
than those the Supreme Court considered—whether admiralty jurisdiction 
extended to incidents on navigable rivers within counties of states and beyond 
tidewaters.  The Supreme Court had addressed those issues, in a somewhat 
meandering, though by 1857, apparently settled path.  In The Steamboat 
Thomas Jefferson, the Court, speaking through Justice Joseph Story, had held 
that cases involving maritime service contracts fell within admiralty 
jurisdiction only if those agreements were to be “substantially performed . . . 
 
 9. Id. at 297. 
 10. Id. at 296–97. 
 11. Id. at 296, 297. 
 12. Id. at 297–98. 
 13. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 298. 
 14. Id. at 296. 
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upon the sea, or upon waters within the ebb and flow of the tide.”15  Other 
decisions by the Marshall and Taney Courts followed this doctrine.16 
Although Justice Story had made clear in The Thomas Jefferson that the 
tidewater concept limited admiralty jurisdiction, he suggested that Congress 
could extend federal jurisdiction to inland rivers through the Commerce 
Clause.17  Political pressure built on Congress to expand admiralty jurisdiction 
in the 1840s18 and ultimately it apparently followed Story’s suggestion in 1845 
when it adopted a statute extending federal jurisdiction to the Great Lakes and 
the “navigable waters” connecting to them.19  The statute conferred the same 
jurisdiction in contract or tort cases on these waters as the federal courts had in 
cases involving vessels “in navigation and commerce upon the high seas, or 
tide waters, within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United 
States.”20  Although Congress did not specifically predicate the Great Lakes 
Act on the Commerce Clause, a number of the important framers of the statute 
seem to have acted with that power in mind.21 
In the mid-1840s, the Court continued to invoke the tidewater test even 
when reaching results which demonstrated some imaginative fact-finding.  
Most notably, in Waring v. Clarke,22 the Court held that admiralty jurisdiction 
extended to a collision between two vessels 95 miles north of New Orleans and 
200 miles above the mouth of the Mississippi River.23  The trial court had 
found that the tide affected the river where the collision occurred;24 the 
Supreme Court held that although the tidewater limit applied, admiralty 
 
 15. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825).  Id. at 428–29. 
 16. See, e.g., The Steamboat Orleans v. Phoebus, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 175, 182–83 (1837) 
(using tidewater test to measure admiralty jurisdiction); Peyroux v. Howard, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 324, 
343 (1833) (applying tidewater test but holding Mississippi River at New Orleans affected by 
tide). 
 17. The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 430. 
 18. See, e.g., 5 CARL B. SWISHER, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE: THE TANEY 
PERIOD 1836–64, at 427–29 (Paul A. Freund ed., 1974) (describing the discontent among ship 
owners over the lack of federal jurisdiction on rivers and the Great Lakes and their petitions 
asking for federal rather than state jurisdiction). 
 19. Act of Feb. 26, 1845, ch. 20, 5 Stat. 726 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1873 
(1952)). 
 20. Id.  Some suggest Story wrote the statute.  See, e.g., SWISHER, supra note 18, at 429, 
430, 437; The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 296, 342 (1857) (Campbell, J., dissenting) 
(stating Story was reputed to be the author); see id. at 315–16 (Daniel, J., dissenting) (noting that 
“a portion of this court” applied pressure to Congress to make changes). 
 21. SWISHER, supra note 18, at 430–31. 
 22. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441 (1847). 
 23. Id. at 451, 464. 
 24. See id. at 450 (noting the trial court overruled the objection to its jurisdiction thereby 
accepting the argument that the tide ebbed and flowed at the point of the collision). 
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jurisdiction extended to waters within the body of a county as well as on the 
seas.25 
The Court considered the constitutionality of the 1845 Act during its 1851 
term in The Genesee Chief, a case arising from a collision between a vessel of 
that name and the Steamboat Cuba on Lake Ontario.26  The lower federal court 
found the Genesee Chief at fault; on appeal, the Supreme Court considered 
whether it had subject matter jurisdiction of the case, a decision which turned 
on whether the Great Lakes Act was constitutional.27  The Court held that it 
was, but not as an exercise of the Commerce power.28  Instead, Chief Justice 
Taney wrote an elaborate majority opinion which went beyond the issues the 
case presented to vindicate an expansive admiralty jurisdiction.29  Taney 
reasoned that Congress did not intend to rest the 1845 Act on the Commerce 
Clause since neither its title nor body evidenced such a disposition.30  
Moreover, Congress could not constitutionally use the Commerce Clause 
simply to confer jurisdiction which was a constitutional concept distinct from 
“regulation” of commerce.31 
The statute was, however, within the meaning of the Admiralty 
Jurisdiction Clause, Taney concluded.32  If the case had raised a question of 
first impression, Taney thought it would be easily resolved in favor of the 
statute’s constitutionality since the Great Lakes were “inland seas” which 
supported interstate and international commerce similar to that on the oceans.33  
Limiting admiralty jurisdiction to the Atlantic states offended a structural 
principle implicit in the Constitution of “equal rights among all the states.”34  
Logic did not dictate confining admiralty jurisdiction based on the ebb and 
flow of the tide; such a test was “merely arbitrary, without any foundation in 
reason; and, indeed, would seem to be inconsistent with it.”35  If a body was “a 
public navigable water, on which commerce is carried on between different 
 
 25. Id. at 464. 
 26. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 450, 451 (1851). 
 27. Id. at 451. 
 28. Id. at 458. 
 29. See GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 32 n.99 
(Univ. Textbook Ser., 2d ed. 1975) (describing case as decided on “unnecessarily broad 
grounds”).  See also DAVID W. ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM: HISTORY AND 
ANALYSIS OF PROBLEMS OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN THE MARITIME LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES 112–19 (Univ. Textbook Ser., 1970) (putting The Genesee Chief in historical 
context). 
 30. The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 452. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 453 (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 454. 
 35. The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 454. 
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States or nations, the reason for the jurisdiction is precisely the same.”36  In 
England, the tidewater test provided a useful surrogate since tidewater and 
navigability were synonyms, and the same logic fit the circumstances when the 
Constitution was adopted since all of the states were located on the Atlantic.37  
That reasoning explained the result in The Thomas Jefferson and its progeny.  
When those decisions were rendered, “the great importance of the question as 
it now presents itself could not be foreseen”; accordingly, “the subject did not 
therefore receive that deliberate consideration” which it now deserved.38  
Applying the tidewater test in 1851 would be “utterly inadmissible,” for it 
would arbitrarily preclude admiralty jurisdiction from “thousands of miles of 
public navigable water.”39  Moreover, that definition violated the intent of the 
founding generation as reflected in the Judiciary Act of 1789, which extended 
admiralty jurisdiction to navigable waters within counties as well as on the 
high seas.40  The Court would feel bound to follow The Thomas Jefferson if 
that case had decided a question of property law upon which others had 
relied.41  As a mere jurisdictional decision, it commanded no such respect and 
must be overruled to avoid “serious public as well as private inconvenience 
and loss.”42  Only Justice Daniel dissented from the Chief Justice’s opinion, 
and he did so in a two page opinion, relying primarily instead on his earlier 
pronouncements.43  In the next reported case, the Court applied The Genesee 
Chief’s dicta to a collision on the Mississippi River and summarily held that 
“the constitutional jurisdiction of the United States in admiralty was not 
limited by tide-water, but was extended to the lakes and navigable rivers of the 
United States.”44 
Taney’s opinion for the Court in The Genesee Chief, as extended, would 
seem to have resolved the issue.  Yet six years later, The Steamboat Magnolia 
brought those issues back to the Supreme Court.45  And although the Court 
adhered to the principles in Taney’s opinion in The Genesee Chief, this time 
the divisions on the Court were more palpable, not only in the 6–3 decision,46 
but in the number and intensity of opinions.  Four justices felt moved to offer 
sometimes lengthy, and in some instances impassioned, opinions.  Justice 
Grier, who had served on the Court since President James Polk appointed him 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 455. 
 38. Id. at 456. 
 39. Id. at 457. 
 40. The Genesee Chief, (12 How.) at 457. 
 41. Id. at 458. 
 42. Id. at 458–59. 
 43. Id. at 463–65 (Daniel, J., dissenting). 
 44. Fretz v. Bull, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 466, 468 (1851). 
 45. 61 U.S. (20 How.) 296 (1857). 
 46. Id. at 303. 
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in 1846,47 wrote the majority opinion in which six justices joined.48  The 
seventy-two-year-old John McLean, a member of the Court since Andrew 
Jackson appointed him in 1829,49 filed a concurrence “to be on one or two 
points somewhat more explicit” than the Court had been.50  Justice Peter 
Daniel, a nominee of President Martin Van Buren,51 dissented,52 as did Justice 
John Campbell,53 who, as a nominee of President Franklin Pierce, was the 
junior justice.54  Justice John Catron, also a Jackson appointee,55 joined 
Campbell’s dissent.56 
The intensity of feeling was reflected in the length and tone of the 
dissenting opinions.  Whereas Grier presented the majority opinion in a little 
more than five pages, and McLean added a four-page concurrence,57 Daniel 
filed a fifteen-page dissent dripping with Scalia-esque sarcasm, and Campbell 
added a twenty-one-page scholarly dissertation.58  Campbell’s closing lines 
revealed the stakes he perceived in the case and exposed the depth of his 
feeling.  He wrote: 
I consider that the present case carries the jurisdiction to an incalculable extent 
beyond any other, and all others, that have heretofore been pronounced, and 
 
 47. Frank Otto Gatell, Robert C. Grier, in 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT 434, 436 
(Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., rev. ed. 1997). 
 48. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 297. 
 49. Frank Otto Gatell, John McLean, in 1 THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT 300, 305 
(Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., rev. ed. 1997). 
 50. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 303 (McLean, J., concurring). 
 51. Van Buren nominated Daniel a week before leaving office.  JOHN P. FRANK, JUSTICE 
DANIEL DISSENTING: A BIOGRAPHY OF PETER V. DANIEL, 1784–1860, at 154–55, 160 (1964).  
He was confirmed on March 2, 1841, a little more than a day before William Henry Harrison took 
the oath of office.  Id. 
 52. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 307 (Daniel, J., dissenting).  During his 
nineteen years on the Court, Daniel never wrote a majority opinion on an admiralty case, almost 
invariably concluding that admiralty jurisdiction was lacking.  See FRANK, supra note 51, at 182.  
As Graydon Staring observed, Daniel “fought a losing campaign of vehement dissents . . . to 
retain the English restriction to tidewater in both tort and contract cases, even seven years after 
the issue had been conclusively decided otherwise in The Genesee Chief.”  Graydon S. Staring, 
The Admiralty Jurisdiction of Torts and Crimes and the Failed Search for its Purposes, 38 J. 
MAR. L. & COM. 433, 457–58 (2007). 
 53. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 322 (Campbell, J., dissenting). 
 54. William Gillette, John A. Campbell, in 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra 
note 47, at 462, 464.  Campbell later became one of six former justices to argue before the Court 
after serving on it.  See Charles T. Fenn, Note, Supreme Court Justices: Arguing Before the Court 
After Resigning From the Bench, 84 GEO. L.J. 2473, 2473–74 (1996). 
 55. Frank Otto Gatell, John Catron, in 1 THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 
49, at 371, 378. 
 56. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 303. 
 57. Id. at 303–07 (McLean, J., dissenting). 
 58. Id. at 307–22 (Daniel, J., dissenting); Id. at 322–43 (Campbell, J., dissenting). 
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that it must create a revolution in the admiralty administration of the courts of 
the United States; that the change will produce heart-burning and discontent, 
and involve collisions with State Legislatures and State jurisdictions.  And, 
finally, it is a violation of the rights reserved in the Constitution of the United 
States to the States and the people.59 
The contemporary observer cannot help but be perplexed that 
notwithstanding Taney’s opinion in The Genesee Chief, constitutional issues 
regarding the tidewater test percolated again to the Court six years later.  In 
part, the return was due to counsel’s claim that even if the Constitution allowed 
admiralty jurisdiction to extend beyond the tidewater, neither the Constitution 
nor Congress in the 1789 act had so extended it.60  Moreover, the incongruity 
may rest in part on the different American legal culture, which existed in the 
1850s than that familiar to us now.  Daniel Hulsebosch points out that judicial 
precedent, though important then, did not have the dominant status among 
sources of law that it later achieved following the advent of the case method by 
Christopher Columbus Langdell after the Civil War.61  In any event, the return 
of the issue six years later, and the passions it aroused as reflected in the 
opinions, suggested something more was at stake than the simple issue 
ostensibly before the Court. 
II.  THEMES AND TEACHING OPPORTUNITIES IN THE STEAMBOAT MAGNOLIA 
The issues upon which the outcome in The Steamboat Magnolia pivoted 
become anything but banal once the consequences of the dispute and the 
underlying jurisprudential assumptions are exposed.  Moreover, the case raises 
enduring issues in law, which recur in admiralty and elsewhere.  Although 
Taney’s opinion in The Genesee Chief provided much of the basis for what 
Justices Grier and McLean wrote, the presence of two lengthy and impassioned 
dissents in The Steamboat Magnolia, compared to Justice Daniel’s terse protest 
in the earlier case, makes The Steamboat Magnolia, in my view, the superior 
teaching vehicle.  The remainder of this essay identifies some of the themes 
that the case may helpfully be used to suggest. 
A. Purposive vs. Positivistic Visions of Law 
The clash between Justices Grier and McLean on the one hand, and 
Justices Daniel and Campbell on the other, turned on their different visions of 
the nature of law.  Grier and McLean thought law needed to be shaped in 
accordance with its underlying purposes.  Although Grier made this argument 
succinctly by relying on language from the Court’s decision in The Genesee 
 
 59. Id. at 342–43 (Campbell, J., dissenting). 
 60. ROBERTSON, supra note 29, at 116–17. 
 61. Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Writs to Rights: “Navigability” and the Transformation of the 
Common Law in the Nineteenth Century, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1049, 1063–64 (2002). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] BEYOND THE TIDE 529 
Chief,62 McLean emphasized it in his concurring opinion.  In England, he 
wrote, the ebb and flow of the tide was synonymous with navigability, and that 
rule had been applied initially in the United States, where navigability of the 
rivers which flowed into the Atlantic were similarly constrained.63  Yet the 
tidewater rule had also been applied to America’s western rivers, as judges 
deferred to “an established rule where the reason or necessity on which it was 
founded fails.”64  The rule made sense in England, and in the Atlantic states 
where “the ebb and flow of the tide marked the extent of the navigableness of 
rivers.”65  Inasmuch as “the navigability of our Western rivers in no instance 
depends upon the tide,” the rule was applied unreasonably in that new 
context.66 
The dissenters proceeded from a different premise.  They understood law 
in more positivistic terms.67  Law was law, whether reasonable or not.  Justice 
Daniel, for instance, pointed to venerable English laws, which excluded 
admiralty jurisdiction from the “realm” or within “the bodies of the counties,” 
and confined it to waters affected by the ebb and flow of the tide.68  That was 
 
 62. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 299 (“In the case of the Genesee Chief, 
we have decided, that though in England the flux and reflux of the tide was a sound and 
reasonable test of a navigable river, because on that island tide-water and navigable water were 
synonymous terms, yet that ‘there is certainly nothing in the ebb and flow of the tide that makes 
the waters peculiarly suitable for admiralty jurisdiction, nor anything in the absence of a tide that 
renders it unfit.  If it is a public navigable water on which commerce is carried on between 
different States or nations, the reason for the jurisdiction is precisely the same.  And if a 
distinction is made on that account, it is merely arbitrary, without any foundation in reason—and, 
indeed, contrary to it.’”) (internal citation omitted). 
 63. Id. at 303 (McLean, J., concurring). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 300–02 (majority opinion); see also id. at 303–05 (McLean, J., concurring).  See 
also The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 453–54 (1851) (“If the meaning of these terms 
was now for the first time brought before this court for consideration, there could, we think, be no 
hesitation in saying that the lakes and their connecting waters were embraced in them.  These 
lakes are in truth inland seas.  Different States border on them on one side, and a foreign nation 
on the other.  A great and growing commerce is carried on upon them between different States 
and a foreign nation, which is subject to all the incidents and hazards that attend commerce on the 
ocean.  Hostile fleets have encountered on them, and prizes been made; and every reason which 
existed for the grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the general government on the Atlantic seas, 
applies with equal force to the lakes.  There is an equal necessity for the instance and for the prize 
power of the admiralty court to administer international law, and if the one cannot be established 
neither can the other.”); Id. at 456–57 (“But [Waring v. Clarke] showed the unreasonableness of 
giving a construction to the Constitution which would measure the jurisdiction of the admiralty 
by the tide.”). 
 67. See The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 308 (Daniel, J., dissenting) (noting 
that the court must resist expanding the admiralty jurisdiction as incompatible with our lawful 
guarantees and proceeding to examine the previous cases before the court). 
 68. Id. at 312 (original emphasis omitted). 
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the admiralty law “at the period of separation from the American colonies,” 
and the “admiralty law of England, according to every accurate test, was the 
admiralty law of the United States at the period of the adoption of the 
Constitution,”69 a claim Daniel repeated at every opportunity.70  That law had 
been followed by the Court’s early precedents.71 
 Justice Campbell also embraced a similar conception of law.  He traced 
the development and limitations on admiralty jurisdiction in Great Britain, 
which were incorporated in the North American settlements.72  To Campbell, 
the appropriate question was “how would a case like that before this court have 
been decided in England, either at the period of the Declaration of 
Independence, or at the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, in the 
court of admiralty?”73  His lengthy analysis makes clear his view that the 
jurisdiction the Court recognized in The Steamboat Magnolia was well beyond 
constitutional bounds and antithetical to the principles which animated the 
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. 
B. Living Law vs. Originalism 
The four opinions present an impassioned dispute regarding the relative 
merits of the competing methods of constitutional interpretation.  Although the 
names of the proponents differ, the arguments resemble those in contemporary 
opinions. 
In The Genesee Chief, Chief Justice Taney had rejected the tidewater test 
based on living constitutionalism premises,74 and the majority opinion rested in 
part on the need for law to accommodate changing exigencies.  Two 
developments in particular made the tidewater test obsolete.  America had 
expanded geographically to include the network of inland rivers.75  Moreover, 
technological advances, principally the invention of the steamship, made 
commercial navigation on those rivers possible and advantageous.76 
 
 69. Id. at 312–13. 
 70. See, e.g., id. at 313 (“Under such a state of the admiralty law, conceded to be the law of 
England, and as I contend, the law of the United States, . . .”). 
 71. Id. at 313–15. 
 72. The  Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 323–27 (Campbell, J., dissenting). 
 73. Id. at 327. 
 74. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 451 (1851) (“The language and decision of this court, whenever 
a question of admiralty jurisdiction had come before it, seemed to imply that under the 
Constitution of the United States, the jurisdiction was confined to tide-waters.  Yet the conviction 
that this definition of admiralty powers was narrower than the Constitution contemplated, has 
been growing stronger every day with the growing commerce on the lakes and navigable rivers of 
the western States.”). 
 75. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 301. 
 76. Id. (“When these States were colonies, and for a long time after the adoption of the 
Constitution of the United States, the shores of the great lakes of the North, above and beyond the 
ocean tides, were as yet almost uninhabited, except by savages.  The necessities of commerce and 
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Justice McLean espoused a version of the living law.  He discounted 
concerns that an expanded admiralty jurisdiction in the west would be inimical 
to the “wishes and interests” of people in that region by noting its beneficent 
execution in the east.77  “Experience is a better rule of judgment than theory,” 
he observed, and accordingly the successful use of admiralty in the east 
commended its extension.78 
Yet his strongest invocation of living law occurred in his concluding 
paragraph: 
 Antiquity has its charms, as it is rarely found in the common walks of 
professional life; but it may be doubted whether wisdom is not more frequently 
found in experience and the gradual progress of human affairs; and this is 
especially the case in all systems of jurisprudence which are matured by the 
progress of human knowledge.79 
It was more instructive to study law’s “present adaptations to human concerns, 
than to trace it back to its beginnings.”80 
Justice Daniel rejected any notion of a living constitution.  Judges were not 
licensed to interpret the Constitution to accommodate changed circumstances, 
a process he characterized as stretching the Constitution “by any application of 
judicial torture, to cover any such exigency, either real or supposed.”81  Indeed, 
he likened the majority opinion in The Steamboat Magnolia to Chief Justice 
Marshall’s statement of living constitutionalism in McCulloch v. Maryland,82 
an  exposition that has now, of course, achieved canonical status.  Daniel 
clearly did not appreciate Marshall’s commitment to living constitutionalism in 
McCulloch but suggested that the majority’s approach in The Steamboat 
Magnolia might be even more egregious.83 
Instead, the dissenters insisted that justices were bound to adhere to the 
Constitution’s original meaning.  Justice Daniel denied that the meaning of the 
 
the progress of steam navigation had not as yet called for the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction, 
except on the ocean border of the Atlantic States.”). 
 77. Id. at 305 (McLean, J., concurring). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 307. 
 80. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 307 (McLean, J., concurring). 
 81. Id. at 319 (Daniel, J., dissenting). 
 82. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819). 
 83. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 319 (Daniel, J., dissenting) (“This 
argument forcibly revives the recollection of the interpretation of the phrase ‘necessary and 
proper,’ once ingeniously and strenuously wielded to prove that a bank, incorporated with every 
faculty and attribute of such an institution, was not in reality, nor was designed to be, a bank; but 
was essentially an agent, an indispensable agent, in the administration of the Federal Government.  
And with reference to this doctrine of necessity, or propriety, or convenience, it may here be 
remarked, that it is as gratuitous and as much out of place with respect to the admiralty 
jurisdiction, as it was with respect to the Bank of the United States—perhaps still more so.”). 
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Constitution could adapt to changing exigencies.84  Justice Campbell 
contended “with perfect safety” that not a single maker or ratifier of the 
Constitution would have thought admiralty jurisdiction extended to the case.85  
That being so, “no change in the opinion of men, nor in the condition of the 
country, nor any apparent expediency, can render that constitutional which 
those who made the Constitution did not design to be so.”86  Justice Campbell 
supported his originalist methodology with the language from Chief Justice 
Taney’s recent majority opinion in Scott v. Sandford: 
If any of the provisions of the Constitution are deemed unjust . . . there is a 
mode prescribed in the instrument itself by which it may be amended; but, 
while it remains unaltered, it must be construed as it was understood at the 
time of its adoption.  It is not only the same in words, but the same in meaning, 
and delegates the same powers to the Government, and secures the same rights 
and privileges to the citizen; and as long as it continues to exist in its present 
form, it speaks not only in the same words, but with the same meaning with 
which it spake when it came from the hands of its framers, and was voted on 
and adopted by the people of the United States.87 
C. Judicial Usurpation of Power 
Justices Grier and McLean viewed their opinions as applying reason and 
constitutional principles as articulated in The Genesee Chief to changing 
circumstances.  Justice Daniel, however, regarded the Court’s decision quite 
differently.  Far from an appropriate effort to accommodate reason and 
changed conditions, he characterized the Court’s interpretation as an instance 
of judicial overreaching.88  The tidewater limit was consistent with a view of 
government “based, in theory at any rate, upon restricted and exactly-defined 
 
 84. Id. at 318–19 (“And this inquiry, therefore, forces itself upon us, viz:, if the system was 
thus limited, and was known to be so by the framers of the Constitution, and if this instrument 
was designed to be applicable to the existing state of things, and was complete in itself, in all its 
delegations of and restrictions upon power, where is to be sought the right or power to enlarge or 
to diminish the effect or meaning of the instrument to make it commensurate with a predicament 
or state of things not merely not existing when the Constitution was framed, but which was not 
even within the contemplation of those by whom it was created?  Such a power could not exist in 
the legislature, the only branch of the Government on which anything like a faculty to originate 
measures was conferred; much less could it be claimed by functionaries who have not, and 
rightfully cannot have, any creative faculties, but whose capacities and duties are restricted to an 
interpretation of the Constitution and laws as they should have been fairly expounded at the times 
of their enactment.”). 
 85. Id. at 334 (Campbell, J., dissenting). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. (quoting Scott v. Sandford (The Dred Scott Case), 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426 
(1857)). 
 88. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 307–08 (Daniel, J., dissenting). 
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delegations of power only,”89 he claimed.  The Genesee Chief, which six years 
earlier had rejected the tidewater test, was “more remarkable and more 
startling as an assumption of judicial power than any which the judicial history 
of the country has hitherto disclosed, prior to the case now under 
consideration.”90  Its decisions were “the most startling and dangerous 
innovations, anterior to that decision, ever attempted upon the powers and 
rights of internal government appertaining to the States.”91 
The Court’s abandonment of the tidewater test, Justice Daniel insisted, 
constituted a usurpation of power.92  That test was part of the original 
understanding.  If changed circumstances made it obsolete, the remedy was to 
amend the Constitution, not to cure the defect through judicial interpretation.93  
 
 89. Id. at 315. 
 90. Id. at 312. 
 91. Id. at 317. 
 92. Id. at 307–08. 
 93. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 317–19 (Daniel, J., dissenting) (“If the 
experience of a pretty long official life had not familiarized me with instances, unhappily not a 
few, in which the meaning and objects of the Constitution and the just influence of the actually 
surrounding condition of the country when that instrument was framed have been lost sight of or 
made to yield to some prevailing vogue of the times, I confess that some surprise would have 
been felt at the seeming forgetfulness of the court in giving utterance to the expressions above 
quoted, of the facts, that when the Constitution was adopted, there was no such navigation as that 
on the Mississippi then known—no such river was then possessed by the United States; that the 
Constitution was formed by, and for, a coexisting political and civil association; was designed to 
be adapted to that state of things; and was in itself complete, and fully adapted to the ends and 
subjects to which it was intended to be applied.  And but for the reason or the examples above 
referred to, the greater surprise would have been awakened by the disregard manifested, in the 
reasoning of the court, to this great fundamental principle of republican government, that if the 
Constitution was, at the period of its adoption, or has since, by the mutations of time and events, 
become inadequate to accomplish the objects of its creation, it belongs exclusively to those who 
formed it, and in whom resides the right to alter or abolished, to remedy its defects.  No such 
power can exist with those who are the creatures of the Constitution, clothed with the humbler 
office of executing the provisions of that instrument.  Suppose, at the time of its adoption, the 
Constitution was universally believed to be defective, in many respects essentially defective, 
would such a conviction have rendered it less the Constitution?  Would it have lessened in any 
degree the obligation of obedience to it, or changed the power whence a remedy for its defects 
was to be derived?  Could the judiciary, without usurpation, have essayed such a remedy?  It is 
conceded by the court, that at the time of forming the Constitution the admiralty jurisprudence of 
England was the only system known and practiced in this country; it is admitted, also, that the 
English system was limited in theory and practice to the ebb and flow of the tide.  It is further 
admitted, that at the time the Constitution was adopted, and our courts of admiralty went into 
operation, the definition which had been adopted in England was equally proper here.  These 
admissions form a virtual surrender of anything like a foundation on which the decision of the 
court could be rested, either in the case of the Genesee Chief or in this case depending on that 
alone.  For, if it be admitted that at the time of the adoption of the Constitution the admiralty rule 
in England limited the jurisdiction to tide-waters, and that the same rule was adopted and was 
proper here, it follows, by inevitable induction, that the jurisdiction intended to be created by the 
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Justice Daniel made manifest the intensity of his feeling by repetition of the 
point and the Scalia-like sarcasm that colored his expression.94 
D. Bright Line Rules vs. Principles 
The opinions also presented a contest between formalism and 
functionalism.  Justice Daniel viewed the Constitution as prescribing bright 
line rules to limit governmental power.95  He argued that the tidewater and 
county rules provided clear guidance whereas navigability, the test the majority 
followed, was “vague and arbitrary, and tending inevitably to confusion and 
conflict” and a standard which would be “a prolific source of uncertainty, of 
contestation and expense.”96  He mocked the Court for abandoning these rules 
 
Constitution was that which was the only one then known, and which, in the language of this 
court, was then proper here, (as the Constitution cannot be supposed to establish anything 
unauthorized or improper,) and necessarily was complete, and adapted to the existing state of 
things.  And this inquiry, therefore, forces itself upon us, viz: if the system was thus limited, and 
was known to be so by the framers of the Constitution, and if this instrument was designed to be 
applicable to the existing state of things, and was complete in itself, in all its delegations of and 
restrictions upon power, where is to be sought the right or power to enlarge or to diminish the 
effect or meaning of the instrument to make it commensurate with a predicament or state of 
things not merely not existing when the Constitution was framed, but which was not even within 
the contemplation of those by whom it was created?  Such a power could not exist in the 
legislature, the only branch of the Government on which anything like a faculty to originate 
measures was conferred; much less could it be claimed by functionaries who have not, and 
rightfully cannot have, any creative faculties, but whose capacities and duties are restricted to an 
interpretation of the Constitution and laws as they should have been fairly expounded at the times 
of their enactment.”). 
 94. See id. at 319 (“Such is the argument of the court, and, correctly interpreted, it amounts 
to this: The Constitution, which at its adoption suited perfectly well the situation of the country, 
and which then was unquestionably of supreme authority, we now adjudge to have become 
unequal to the exigencies of the times; it must therefore be substituted by something more 
efficient; and as the people, and the States, and the Federal Legislature, are tardy or delinquent in 
making this substitution, the duty or the credit of this beneficent work must be devolved upon the 
judiciary.”). 
 95. See id. at 315 (describing the Constitution as creating a national government based on 
“restricted and exactly-defined delegations of power only”). 
 96. Id. at 320 (“For this plain and rational test, this court now attempts to substitute one in its 
nature vague and arbitrary, and tending inevitably to confusion and conflict.  It is now affirmed, 
that the jurisdiction and powers of the admiralty extend to all waters that are navigable within or 
without the territory of a State.  In quest of certainty, under this new doctrine, the inquiry is 
naturally suggested, what are navigable waters?  Will it be proper to adopt, in the interpretation of 
this phrase, an etymological derivation from navis, and to designate, as navigable waters, those 
only on whose bosoms-ships and navies can be floated?  Shall it embrace waters on which sloops 
and shallops, or what are generally termed river craft, can swim; or shall it be extended to any 
water on which a batteau or a pirogue can be floated?  These are all, at any rate, practicable 
waters, navigable in a certain sense.  If any point between the extremes just mentioned is to be 
taken, there is at once opened a prolific source of uncertainty, of contestation and expense.”). 
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“in this age of progress.”97  The majority, of course, thought navigability better 
served the purposes of admiralty jurisdiction.98  Rules should not be followed 
if their animating reason did not apply. 
E. Federalism 
The Steamboat Magnolia brings into clear focus the issues relating to 
national versus state power, which dominated discussions in the period before 
the Civil War.  The debate over the proper scope of admiralty jurisdiction was 
a major battleground between those who thought an expanded admiralty 
jurisdiction would further national economic development and those who saw 
it as an intrusion on state authority.99  As Preble Stolz pointed out, during the 
early years of the nineteenth century, “federal admiralty jurisdiction could be 
legally conceived as coextensive with federal power over commerce,” and 
accordingly cases regarding the admiralty jurisdiction clause potentially 
implicated the definition of Congress’s commerce power.100  At a time when 
these issues divided the nation as the Civil War approached, The Steamboat 
Magnolia recognized a new doctrine which allowed federal judges greater 
power to decide cases involving a major aspect of commercial life. 
The dissenters saw the expansion of admiralty jurisdiction as an 
aggrandizement of the power of the federal government, and one which would 
have fateful results.  Extension of admiralty jurisdiction would send federalism 
cascading down a very slippery slope.  Justice Daniel predicted: 
Under this new regime, the hand of Federal power may be thrust into 
everything, even into a vegetable or fruit basket; and there is no production of 
a farm, an orchard, or a garden, on the margin of these watercourses, which is 
not liable to be arrested on its way to the next market town by the high 
admiralty power, . . .101 
 
 97. Id. at 316 (emphasis omitted). 
 98. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 302 (majority opinion). 
 99. See Robert Force, Choice of Law in Admiralty Cases: “National Interests” and the 
Admiralty Clause, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1421, 1430 (2001). 
 100. Preble Stolz, Pleasure Boating and Admiralty: Erie at Sea, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 661, 675 
(1963). 
 101. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 320–21 (Daniel, J., dissenting) (“Under 
this new regime, the hand of Federal power may be thrust into everything, even into a vegetable 
or fruit basket; and there is no production of a farm, an orchard, or a garden, on the margin of 
these watercourses, which is not liable to be arrested on its way to the next market town by the 
high admiralty power, with all its parade of appendages; and the simple, plain, homely 
countryman, who imagined he had some comprehension of his rights, and their remedies under 
the cognizance of a justice of the peace, or of a county court, is now, through the instrumentality 
of some apt fomenter of trouble, metamorphosed and magnified from a country attorney into a 
proctor, to be confounded and put to silence by a learned display from Roccus de Navibus, 
Emerigon, or Pardessus, from the Mare Clausum, or from the Trinity Masters, or the Apostles.”). 
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Some of the rhetoric in Justice Daniel’s opinion foreshadowed arguments of 
subsequent Commerce Clause cases imagining a parade of horribles from the 
expansion of federal power.102  Daniel condemned “these claims to an all-
controlling central power,” which were inimical to the preservation of State 
government.103 
Justice Campbell was equally vociferous in denouncing this perceived 
assault on principles of federalism and the deleterious consequences that would 
flow from it.  A federal judge, “deriving his appointment from an independent 
Government” would decide cases based on general maritime law, which states 
could not modify.104  The logic of the Court’s decision would subject all cases 
involving interstate or intrastate transportation of persons or property to the 
jurisdiction of federal courts.  Campbell viewed such an outcome as contrary to 
basic democratic principles since, in his view, a judge representing a different 
sovereign would decide matters based on a law that the people of the state 
could not shape.105 
 
 102. See, e.g., NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58, 94–95 (1937) 
(McReynolds, J., dissenting) (“Manifestly that view of Congressional power would extend it into 
almost every field of human industry.  With striking lucidity, fifty years ago, Kidd v. Pearson, 
128 U.S. 1, 21, declared: ‘If it be held that the term [commerce with foreign nations and among 
the several states] includes the regulation of all such manufactures as are intended to be the 
subject of commercial transactions in the future, it is impossible to deny that it would also include 
all productive industries that contemplate the same thing.  The result would be that Congress 
would be invested, to the exclusion of the States, with the power to regulate, not only 
manufactures, but also agriculture, horticulture, stock raising, domestic fisheries, mining—in 
short, every branch of human industry.’”). 
 103. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 321 (Daniel, J., dissenting). 
 104. Id. at 341 (Campbell, J., dissenting). 
 105. Id. (“A single judge, deriving his appointment from an independent Government, 
administers in that court a code which a Federal judge has described as ‘resting upon the general 
principles of maritime law, and that it is not competent to the States, by any local legislation, to 
enlarge, or limit, or narrow it.’  (2 Story R., 456.)  If the principle of this decree is carried to its 
logical extent, all cases arising in the transportation of property or persons from the towns and 
landing-places of the different States, to other towns and landing-places, whether in or out of the 
State; all cases of tort or damage arising in the navigation of the internal waters, whether 
involving the security of persons or title to property, in either; all cases of supply to those 
engaged in the navigation, not to enumerate others, will be cognizable in the District Courts of the 
United States.  If the dogma of judges in regard to the system of laws to be administered prevails, 
then this, whole class of cases may be drawn ad aliud examen, and placed under the dominion of 
a foreign code, whether they arise among citizens or others.  The States are deprived of the power 
to mould their own laws in respect of persons and things within their limits, and which are 
appropriately subject to their sovereignty.  The right of the people to self-government is thus 
abridged—abridged to the precise extent, that a judge appointed by another Government may 
impose a law, not sanctioned by the representatives or agents of the people, upon the citizens of 
the State.”). 
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F. Admiralty vs. Common Law 
The case also juxtaposed the claims to admiralty jurisdiction as against 
those of common law courts.  Justice Daniel, who routinely opposed assertions 
of admiralty jurisdiction, saw The Steamboat Magnolia as the most recent in a 
pattern of intruding into the domain of common law courts.106  He decried “the 
claims advanced for the admiralty power, in its constant attempts at 
encroachment upon the principles and genius of the common law, and of our 
republican and peculiar institutions, . . .”107  Daniel’s point signals the 
existence of a jury/nonjury tension associated with the existence of admiralty 
courts in addition to the federalism vector. 
G. Equal Treatment 
The majority defended its result, in part, based on the argument that it 
would vindicate a basic principle of the Constitution, conferring “perfect 
equality in the rights and privileges of the citizens of the different States, not 
only in the laws of the General Government, but in the mode of administering 
them.”108  It would violate one of the “first principles” of the Union to make 
admiralty jurisdiction along the eastern seaboard but not to the inland states 
adjacent to the inland rivers.109  The argument was not original to Justice Grier.  
In fact, he borrowed heavily from the more elaborate argument Chief Justice 
Taney had offered six years earlier in The Genesee Chief.110  Justice Daniel 
 
 106. Id. at 311–12 (Daniel, J., dissenting). 
 107. Id. at 311.  See also id. at 322 (Campbell, J., dissenting) (“That this court has assumed a 
jurisdiction over a case only cognizable at the common law, and triable by a jury.”). 
 108. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 302 (majority opinion). 
 109. Id. 
 110. The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 454 (1851) (“Again.  The union is formed 
upon the basis of equal rights among all the States.  Courts of admiralty have been found 
necessary in all commercial countries, not only for the safety and convenience of commerce, and 
the speedy decision of controversies, where delay would often be ruin, but also to administer the 
laws of nations in a season of war, and to determine the validity of captures and questions of prize 
or no prize in a judicial proceeding.  And it would be contrary to the first principles on which the 
Union was formed to confine these rights to the States bordering on the Atlantic, and to the tide-
water rivers connected with it, and to deny them to the citizens who border on the lakes, and the 
great navigable streams which flow through the western States.  Certainly such was not the 
intention of the framers of the Constitution; and if such be the construction finally given to it by 
this court, it must necessarily produce great public inconvenience, and at the same time fail to 
accomplish one of the great objects of the framers of the Constitution: that is, a perfect equality in 
the rights and the privileges of the citizens of the different States; not only in the laws of the 
general government, but in the mode of administering them.  That equality does not exist, if the 
commerce on the lakes and on the navigable waters of the West are denied the benefits of the 
same courts and the same jurisdiction for its protection which the Constitution secures to the 
States bordering on the Atlantic.”). 
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dismissed this argument as irrelevant.111  The irony, of course, was that the 
Court celebrated this ideal of state equality, which Chief Justice Taney and his 
colleagues found in the structure of the Constitution, when, only a year earlier, 
the Court had been unable to find any equality principle which could allow an 
African American to be a citizen.112 
H. The Impact of Changed Circumstance on Law 
As previously mentioned, the issue in The Steamboat Magnolia arose due 
to two different types of changed circumstances—territorial expansion and 
technological change.113  The former added the inland river system of the 
western states on which admiralty jurisdiction would not apply under the 
tidewater and not-in-the-county tests.  The latter brought the steamboat, which 
made commercial navigation on the rivers possible as vessels could now 
operate commercially into, as well as with, the current.  As such, the case 
presents an opportunity to explore two recurring themes in law—the way that 
demographic and scientific change present new challenges for law and put 
pressure on prevailing doctrine. 
The dissenters were not eager to embrace this change.  On the contrary, 
they were anxious to deploy law to preserve a Jeffersonian vision of the 
nineteenth century.  Daniel’s biographer, John P. Frank, called him a more 
loyal adherent to Jeffersonian principles than Jefferson himself, “an 
intransigent, indefatigable, stubborn outpost of eighteenth century thought in 
nineteenth century United States.”114 
I. Law in Context 
Cases in law school are typically arranged and presented based on 
conceptual categories.  That organization and treatment often hides the 
historical context in which cases arise in two respects.  Not only may that 
 
 111. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 321 (Daniel, J., dissenting) (“Not the 
least curious circumstance marking this course, is the assertion, that it produces equality amongst 
all the citizens of the United States.  Equality it may be, but it is equality of subjection to an 
unknown and unlimited discretion, in lieu of allegiance to defined and legitimate authority.”). 
 112. Scott v. Sandford (The Dred Scott Case), 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 406 (1856). 
 113. See generally Milton Conover, Geography and Industry in the Development of Admiralty 
and Maritime Jurisdiction, 27 BROOK. L. REV. 273 (1961) (discussing how exploration of 
America’s rivers and lakes in the years following the Judiciary Act of 1789 highlighted the 
inadequacy of the old English definition and how that inadequacy was compounded by the 
growing importance of nagivation with advancements in science and industry).  See also Milton 
Conover, The Abandonment of the “Tidewater” Concept of Admiralty Jurisdiction in the United 
States, 38 OR. L. REV. 34, 53 (1958) (calling The Genesee Chief  “a bright page in our 
jurisprudence in that it demonstrates the ability of the law to adjust to political and economic 
growth”). 
 114. See FRANK, supra note 51, at viii. 
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approach obscure the way in which doctrine evolves from case to case over 
time, but an arrangement that lifts a case from the era in which it was decided 
may imply that topic is a more relevant category than time.  Yet history also 
has its claims and decisions turn on surrounding societal events, the 
composition of the Court, and the other matters the justices are 
contemporaneously considering. 
The Steamboat Magnolia presents a compelling reminder that law, even 
admiralty law, occurs in a larger historical context, which shapes disputes and 
decisions.  Although students (and their teachers) often seem to assume that 
cases exist only in the artifical context of the surrounding pages of the 
casebook, history provides a more relevant backdrop.  The Steamboat 
Magnolia arose only a few years before the Civil War and was decided thirteen 
months after Scott v. Sandford, a connection which Justice Campbell’s citation 
helps make.115  The jurisprudential debates regarding methods of constitutional 
interpretation, federalism, and judicial role become more vivid and 
consequential when students locate this collision case in the period in which it 
found its way onto the Court’s docket.  The events of the era added passion to 
the issues over which the justices sparred in The Steamboat Magnolia. 
J. The Role of Mistake in Shaping Law 
Law, even good law, sometimes rests on mistaken assumptions.  That was 
certainly true in The Steamboat Magnolia. 
Even recognizing the difficulty of attributing intent to a legislative body, 
Taney’s argument that the Great Lakes Act rested on the Admiralty 
Jurisdiction Clause, not the Commerce Clause, seems dubious.116  Recognizing 
an expanded Commerce Clause presented perils, particularly to those 
concerned that Congress might use a more robust Commerce Clause to 
regulate or prohibit slave trade.117  Resting the Act on a jurisdictional clause 
seemed less likely to court that perceived danger.118 
Moreover, the assumption that the tidewater test in England was a 
surrogate for navigability was wrong.  On the contrary, English jurists did not 
view the two terms as synonyms119 nor did all early American authorities.120 
 
 115. 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 334 (Campbell, J., dissenting). 
 116. See SWISHER, supra note 18, at 430–31 (noting that Story did not indicate which clause 
supported the bill and did not specifically identify the Admiralty Clause as a source of authority); 
Hulsebosch, supra note 61, at 1099.  Cf. ROBERTSON, supra note 29, at 113 (suggesting the 
possibility of invoking federal question jurisdiction). 
 117. Hulsebosch, supra note 61, at 1099. 
 118. Id. at 1099, 1104–05; Stolz, supra note 100, at 682. 
 119. Hulsebosch, supra note 61, at 1079. 
 120. Id. at 1082.  Chancellor Kent did equate them and his influence explained why many 
American lawyers erroneously thought tidal and navigable were equivalent terms in England.  Id. 
at 1083–84, 1090. 
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Ultimately, the precarious quality of some of its foundation does not 
undermine the contribution made by the opinions of Grier and McLean in The 
Steamboat Magnolia and of Taney in The Genesee Chief.  They believed that 
rules should be applied in harmony with their purposes.  And they established 
a more comprehensive admiralty jurisdiction, which could handle disputes on 
the inland rivers and lakes as well as the oceans. 
CONCLUSION 
The Steamboat Magnolia put to rest judicial controversy over whether 
admiralty jurisdiction extended beyond the ebb and flow of the tide and within 
the bounds of a county.121 Yet many of the issues its opinions considered, 
explicitly or implicitly, continue to dominate discussions of law more than a 
century and a half later.  Modern discussions over the propriety and scope of 
federal common law, in admiralty as well as elsewhere, were foreshadowed 
there.122  So were issues which have larger import, such as whether the 
Constitution should be viewed as “living” or based on the intent of its framers, 
whether rules are preferable to balancing tests, and whether it is more 
important that law be certain or reasoned. 
The Steamboat Magnolia thus illustrates that Admiralty is not simply 
about passing agreements, perils of the sea, and the ebb and flow of the tide.  It 
is also about federalism, separation of powers, theories of constitutional 
interpretation, and larger jurisprudential and legal process issues relating to the 
very nature of law.  It presents these issues through opinions which rest on 
premises and which advance competing visions.  The Steamboat Magnolia 
alerts the admiralty student that he or she is about to navigate on an exciting 
journey. 
That’s why I begin my admiralty journey with The Steamboat Magnolia. 
 
 
 121. David J. Bederman, Admiralty Jurisdiction, 31 J. MAR. L. & COM. 189, 194 (2000) 
(“Not even today’s most vociferous critics of admiralty jurisdiction can find fault in this 
momentous decision.”). 
 122. See, e.g., Robert Force, An Essay on Federal Common Law and Admiralty, 43 ST. LOUIS 
U. L.J. 1367, 1368 (1999). 
